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#### Lecture 13: Externalities

December 3, 2024

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- 1. Administrative Notes
- 2. Ripped from headlines
- 3. Externalities
  - 3.1 Lecture
  - 3.2 Group discussions

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### **Course Administration**

- 1. Please come to office hours
  - if you scored less than 50 on the midterm, I expect to see you
- 2. Lecture 14 summary assignment posted
  - Please don't use # in file names as it causes download problems
- 3. Problem Set 12 posted
- 4. Some Chapter 10 End-of-Chapter questions posted
- 5. Evaluations

Admin

- Please do online evaluation before 12/11
- Thanks to 1 afternoon and 2 evening students who have completed
- TA evaluation here and by email
- 6. Any other questions or outstanding issues?



### PS 9: Examples of Barriers to Entry and Exit

Despite It All, Two New U.S. Airlines Prepare to Fly

There are risks to starting an airline in any economic climate. But during a pandemic? The entrepreneurs behind the budget airlines Avelo and Breeze Airways see an opportunity.

- passenger airline is a high fixed cost industry
- $\rightarrow$  difficult to enter

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- pandemic makes gates cheaper
- employees pilots, attendants, mechanics - cheaper
- (from Leah) planes cheaper

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## PS 9: Examples of Barriers to Entry and Exit

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There are risks to starting an airline in any economic climate during a pandemic? The entrepreneurs behind the budget airlines Avelo and Breeze Airways see an opportunity.

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- pandemic makes gates cheaper
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ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS > MARIJUANA INVESTING

Biggest Challenges for the Cannabis Industry in 2024

Investopedia:

By MATTHEW JOHNSTON Updated Narch 00, 2024 Reviewed by THOMAS BROCK

- Cannabis business is difficult to enter
- need regulatory approval
- federal regulatory regime unclear
- banking access limited
- need access to capital to invest

#### How What You're Learning is Policy-Relevant Ripped from Headlines presentation(s)

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#### As a reminder, next week Send the article by Wednesday midnight for approval

#### Afternoon

#### Done!

Evening, individual presentation
Finder Presenter

Kate B. Abimbola O.



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#### Today's Ripped from the Headlines

Afternoon, joint presentation – last one! <u>Finder</u> Presenter Michael J. Elly H. Corey D.

Evening, individual	presentation
Finder	Presenter
Ramadan AA.	Katelyn H.

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#### Today: Externalities

1. Identifying Externalities

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- 2. The Problems Externalities Cause
- 3. How to Solve Those Same Problems
- 4. Externalities and Policy


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# 1. Identifying Externalities



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### **Defining Externalities**

 $\label{eq:Externality} \text{Externality} \equiv \text{cost or benefit accruing to party not involved in economic transaction}_{\text{Rosen and Gayer, Public Finance}}$ 



### Defining Externalities

 $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Externality} \equiv \mbox{cost or benefit accruing to party not involved in economic transaction}_{Rosen and Gayer, \ Public \ Finance} \\ \mbox{Externality} \equiv \mbox{side effect of an activity that affects by standers whose interests aren't taken into account} \end{array}$ 

Stevenson and Wolfers, Microeconomics



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#### Defining Externalities

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Stevenson and Wolfers, Microeconomics

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Positive externalities

• positive benefits from a transaction for non-participants

Negative externalities

• costs from a transaction for non-participants



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### **Defining Externalities**

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Stevenson and Wolfers, Microeconomics

Positive externalities

• positive benefits from a transaction for non-participants

Negative externalities

• costs from a transaction for non-participants

Examples, please!



#### Prices and Price Changes are Not Externalities

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- For example, home prices rise in your city
- Is the harm to you from these rising prices an externality?



### Prices and Price Changes are Not Externalities

- For example, home prices rise in your city
- Is the harm to you from these rising prices an externality?
- No
  - harm to you offset by gain to seller
  - price change here is redistribution, not change to total surplus

## Prices and Price Changes are Not Externalities

- For example, home prices rise in your city
- Is the harm to you from these rising prices an externality?
- No
  - harm to you offset by gain to seller
  - price change here is redistribution, not change to total surplus
- Put differently: price lets you take everything into account
- Externalities only occur when price doesn't fully signal all underlying costs and benefits

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# 2. Problems Externalities Generate

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Market failure

• ≡ when markets fail to reach the efficient equilibrium



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### Externalities and Market Failure

Market failure

- $\equiv$  when markets fail to reach the efficient equilibrium
- recall that the efficient equilibrium gives the greatest possible total surplus



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### Externalities and Market Failure

#### Market failure

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- this conclusion assumes
  - demand = marginal social benefit
  - supply = marginal social cost

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# Externalities and Market Failure

2. Problems

#### Market failure

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  - demand = marginal social benefit
  - supply = marginal social cost

Private vs external benefits and costs

- Demand side
  - private marginal benefit accrues to purchaser
  - external marginal benefit accrues to person not involved in transaction

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• example?

# Externalities and Market Failure

2. Problems

#### Market failure

- ≡ when markets fail to reach the efficient equilibrium
- recall that the efficient equilibrium gives the greatest possible total surplus
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  - demand = marginal social benefit
  - supply = marginal social cost

Private vs external benefits and costs

- Demand side
  - private marginal benefit accrues to purchaser
  - external marginal benefit accrues to person not involved in transaction
  - example?
- Supply side
  - private marginal cost is borne by producer
  - external marginal cost borne by any who is not the producer

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• example?



Externalities: A Wedge Between Private and Social Costs and Benefits

When externalities exist

- demand  $\neq$  marginal social benefit
- and/or
- supply  $\neq$  marginal social cost

Externalities: A Wedge Between Private and Social Costs and Benefits

2. Problems

When externalities exist

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When externalities exist

 marginal social benefit = marginal private benefit + marginal external benefit 4: Ext. at Large

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- and/or
- marginal social cost = marginal private cost + marginal external cost

Externalities: A Wedge Between Private and Social Costs and Benefits

2. Problems

When externalities exist

- demand  $\neq$  marginal social benefit
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When externalities exist

- marginal social benefit = marginal private benefit + marginal external benefit
- and/or
- marginal social cost = marginal private cost + marginal external cost

#### Therefore: Externalities cause market failure


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2: Problems

3: Solutions

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#### Best of All Worlds: D = MSB and S = MSC




- When demand includes all private and social benefits
- AND
- When supply includes all private and social costs
- Market equilibrium is efficient outcome

• Generates maximal social surplus



Impact of External Benefits on Equilibrium Outcomes

- Suppose demand is ≠ marginal social benefit
- Where is the market equilibrium?
- Where is the socially optimal equilibrium?




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


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


 $\rightarrow$  Market underproduces products with positive externalities



#### Impact of External Costs on Equilibrium Outcomes

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


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


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### Impact of External Costs on Equilibrium Outcomes

- Suppose supply is  $\neq$  marginal social cost
- Where is the market equilibrium?
- Where is the socially optimal equilibrium?



 $\rightarrow$  Market overproduces products with negative externalities

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Note: Socially Optimal Pollution Not Zero

- Pollution activities go hand-in-hand with production outcomes we like
- For example, electricity requires some pollution
- How much is socially optimal?
- Probably not zero

## Note: Socially Optimal Pollution Not Zero

2: Problems

- Pollution activities go hand-in-hand with production outcomes we like
- For example, electricity requires some pollution
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#### Example: WWI US Steel Production

- Steel production is dirty
  - increases infant mortality
  - estimate: +3%
- Steel production is lucrative
  - increased incomes and public services
  - $\bullet \ \rightarrow \ {\sf decrease} \ {\sf infant} \ {\sf mortality}$
  - estimate: -2%
- On net, local steel production harms outweigh benefits

Thank you Mark Van Orden's paper.

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# 3. Solutions to Externality Problems

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#### Multiple Possible Solutions

- 1. Private bargaining
- 2. Corrective taxes and subsidies
- 3. Cap and trade
- 4. Direct control: Laws and regulations

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3: Solutions

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### Solution 1: Private Bargaining

- Harmed party pays
  - Payment equal to external marginal cost

3: Solutions

4: Ext. at Large

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# Solution 1: Private Bargaining

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3: Solutions

4: Ext. at Large

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Problems

3: Solutions

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#### Coase Theorem

- If
- bargaining is costless
- property rights are assigned and clear

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3: Solutions

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• Goal: understand parameters of private solution success

3: Solutions

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#### Coase Theorem

- If
- bargaining is costless
- property rights are assigned and clear
- Then
  - Private bargaining can return us to the social optimum
- Goal: understand parameters of private solution success
- Examples where this does and doesn't hold?



# Solution 2: Corrective Taxes and Subsidies

• Make producer or consumer "internalize" externality





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- Make producer or consumer "internalize" externality
- For producer: consider external costs of actions




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
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- Make producer or consumer "internalize" externality
- For producer: consider external costs of actions
- For consumer: consider external benefits of actions
- Where are marginal external costs in figure?



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
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
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


- How to force "internalization"?
- Charge tax or offer subsidy
- "Pigouvian" tax or subsidy
- How much tax should we charge?






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




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# Solution 2: Corrective Taxes and Subsidies

- Where is socially optimal equilibrium?
- Where is market equilibrium?






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
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# Solution 2: Corrective Taxes and Subsidies


- Where is socially optimal equilibrium?
- Where is market equilibrium?
- Where is marginal external benefit in figure?





# Solution 2: Corrective Taxes and Subsidies


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# Solution 2: Corrective Taxes and Subsidies

- Where is socially optimal equilibrium?
- Where is market equilibrium?
- Where is marginal external benefit in figure?
- How much subsidy to offer?




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# Solution 2: Corrective Taxes and Subsidies

Same logic holds for subsidies

- Where is socially optimal equilibrium?
- Where is market equilibrium?
- Where is marginal external benefit in figure?
- How much subsidy to offer?
- Where is post-subsidy equilibrium?




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# Solution 2: Corrective Taxes and Subsidies

- Where is socially optimal equilibrium?
- Where is market equilibrium?
- Where is marginal external benefit in figure?
- How much subsidy to offer?
- Where is post-subsidy equilibrium? C



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# Why Don't We Pigouvian Tax Everything?

- Requires policymaker to know external cost or benefit
- For implementation
  - all firms external cost should be the same
  - Or be directly measurable

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- Requires policymaker to know external cost or benefit
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4: Ext. at Large

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# Why Don't We Pigouvian Tax Everything?

- Requires policymaker to know external cost or benefit
- For implementation
  - all firms external cost should be the same
  - Or be directly measurable
- Taxes cause redistribution that is not widely loved
- Only policy solution to this is to return taxes as rebates to harmed partiesl

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3: Solutions

4: Ext. at Large

# Solution 3: Cap and Trade

The Scheme

- Suppose we know the optimal quantity of pollution
- Issue permits to anyone for the total optimal quantity of pollution
- Let permits trade in market

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# Solution 3: Cap and Trade

The Scheme

Benefits of this scheme

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# Solution 3: Cap and Trade

The Scheme

- Suppose we know the optimal quantity of pollution
- Issue permits to anyone for the total optimal quantity of pollution
- Let permits trade in market

Benefits of this scheme

- By construction, you get optimal pollution
- Because firms can sell credits
- And if firms differ in cost of reducing pollution
- Credits make cost of polluting per unit of pollution equal across firms

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Quantity of pollution reduction across firms unequal

2: Problems

3: Solutions

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# Two Cap and Trade Examples

1. Successful (for now): California and Quebec's carbon market

- does seem to have reduced carbon
- number of permits for sale decreases annually
- recent report criticizes geographical distribution of pollution

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# Two Cap and Trade Examples

1. Successful (for now): California and Quebec's carbon market

- does seem to have reduced carbon
- number of permits for sale decreases annually
- recent report criticizes geographical distribution of pollution
- 2. Unsuccessful (for now): European carbon market
  - failure in the sense that it has't reduced emissions
  - too many credits given out!
  - ... but big changes in 2021, prices for permits have risen markedly



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### Solution 4: Laws, Rules and Regulations

- Regulate quantity of production or consumption directly
- Examples? There are 1000s of examples!

4: Ext. at Large

### Solution 4: Laws, Rules and Regulations

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- Examples? There are 1000s of examples!
  - Compulsory schooling
  - Required insurance for drivers
  - Government disallows asbestos

4: Ext. at Large

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# Solution 4: Laws, Rules and Regulations

- Regulate quantity of production or consumption directly
- Examples? There are 1000s of examples!
  - Compulsory schooling
  - Required insurance for drivers
  - Government disallows asbestos
- Sometimes high transaction costs make government rules superior
- Sometimes prescriptive rules hinder more efficient outcomes

# 4. Externalities in the World

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2: Problems

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### Externalities at Large

- Divide into groups some for congestion, some for vaccines
- Answer the questions at the right
- Report back to the class at large

- What is the externality in the article?
- Positive or negative?
- To whom?
- What alternative policy could the government use to remove the externality?

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In Sum: Externalities are Problematic & Problematic Solutions Exist

• Externalities are benefit or harm to those not involved in market transaction

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- They divert us from the efficient equilibrium
- Solutions exist, each somewhat problematic
- · Policy has a major role to play in the presence of externalities



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- See you Dec. 10 last class!
- Do case study, posted on website
- Read case and missing part of Chapter 10
- Read Ripped from Headlines articles



### For Next Class

4: Ext. at Large

- See you Dec. 10 last class!
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l will

- post these lecture notes on my webpage
- post link to lecture recording on Blackboard
- anything else?